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ABSTRACT: A number of moral philosophers have accepted the need 
to make room for acts of supererogation, those that go beyond the call 
of duty. In this paper, we argue that there is also good reason to make 
room for acts of aesthetic supererogation. 
 
 
Many aestheticians and ethicists are interested in the similarities and connections 
between aesthetics and ethics.2 One way in which some have suggested the two 
domains are different is that in ethics there exist obligations while in aesthetics there 
do not.3 However, Marcia Muelder Eaton has argued that there is good reason to 
think that aesthetic obligations do exist.4 We will explore the nature of these 
obligations by asking whether acts of aesthetic supererogation (acts that go beyond 
the call of our aesthetic obligations) are possible. In this paper, we defend the thesis 
that there is good reason to think such acts exist. 
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I. SUPEREROGATION IN MORAL THEORY 
 
Ruqia Hassan was a thirty-year-old journalist who wrote about daily life in occupied 
Raqqa, the Syrian stronghold of Islamic State (ISIS). Through a series of posts on 
social media, Hassan courageously criticized the violent actions of ISIS, the Assad 
regime, and the airstrikes from coalition forces. As her posts became increasingly 
critical, the ISIS police force decided to arrest her. She was arrested in July 2015 and 
executed two months later.5 
Hassan’s decision to risk her life in order to expose the horror of life in Raqqa 
seems to have clear moral value, her actions are admirable and praiseworthy, and 
there was good moral reason to act as she did. However, despite the fact that 
Hassan’s act is one of obvious moral value, it does not seem plausible to think that 
she was morally required to act in this way. It is a commonly accepted feature of 
commonsense morality that there are some acts, like Hassan’s, that are 
supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. 
What is it about acts like Hassan’s that make us reluctant to categorize these acts 
as obligatory? In J. O. Urmson’s paper ‘Saints and Heroes’, he argued that there are 
some morally good actions that no one could decently demand that people perform 
or could fairly blame people who fail to perform them.6 This makes it problematic to 
class these acts as morally required, for two reasons. First, moral requirements are 
often thought to be conceptually tied to demands. According to this thought, if an 
act is morally required for an agent then people can legitimately demand that she 
perform it. John Stuart Mill outlines this link between obligation and demand in the 
following way: ‘It is part of the notion of duty in every one of its forms that a person 
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may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it.’7 If we accept that obligations can be 
legitimately demanded of people but that no one could legitimately demand that 
Hassan act as she did, then we must also accept that Hassan’s act was not morally 
required. 
Second, moral requirements are also thought to be conceptually tied to blame. 
According to this line of thought, someone who violates a moral requirement and 
lacks a good excuse, is blameworthy for her action. Stephen Darwall, for example, 
claims: ‘It is a conceptual truth that an act is morally wrong, if, and only if, it is 
blameworthy if done without an excuse.’8 Again, if we accept this link between moral 
requirements and blameworthiness, and we think that it would have been 
inappropriate to blame Hassan had she acted otherwise (even if she lacked an 
excuse), then we must also accept that Hassan’s act was not morally required. 
These conceptual links between obligation and demands and blame, together with 
the plausible claim that demands or blame would have been inappropriate for 
Hassan’s act, give us reason to accept the existence of acts of supererogation. But 
how should we characterize these acts? 
Since Urmson’s article, a number of moral philosophers have attempted to make 
sense of the supererogatory. While there is no general consensus on exactly how to 
define the concept, there is a general agreement that supererogation involves the 
following necessary and sufficient conditions:  
An act is supererogatory if and only if: 
 
(i) It is morally optional (neither morally required nor morally forbidden). 
(ii) It is morally better than the minimum that morality demands.9 
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If we accept this way of understanding supererogation then we are able to stipulate 
two conditions that are necessary for the existence of supererogatory acts in any 
given normative domain: 
 
(a) That normative domain must generate requirements.  
(b) It must be possible to perform acts that are both permissible (according to the 
given normative domain) and better (according to the given normative domain) 
than the acts that are required by that domain.10 
 
In the next two sections we will argue that there is good reason to think that the 
domain of aesthetics satisfies both criteria. 
 
II. ARE THERE AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS? 
 
Marcia Muelder Eaton defends two arguments for the existence of aesthetic 
obligations.11 First, if there are aesthetic dilemmas, then there must be aesthetic 
obligations from which such dilemmas originate. An aesthetic dilemma could involve 
a classic ‘burning-museum’ case in which one has to make a choice between saving 
one of two paintings, both alike in their ability to enlighten, please, educate, and 
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provoke wonder, but the second being more beautiful.12 Eaton notes that those 
working in art restoration often face precisely these kinds of aesthetic dilemmas in 
their practice. She concludes that the ‘great pains’ restorers take in recording exactly 
what alterations were made, and the ‘sense of real loss’ experienced when restoration 
requires removal of the artist’s work—such as when one painting has been done 
atop a first—are indicative of a genuinely felt obligation.13 What demands 
consideration by the decision-maker in these cases are the aesthetic properties of the 
object – and it is this realm of properties that makes the dilemma an aesthetic one, 
rather than an economic, moral, or any other kind of dilemma. If moral dilemmas 
emerge out of a conflict of moral obligations, then the existence of genuine aesthetic 
dilemmas indicates a conflict between aesthetic obligations. 
Second, we can recognize an obligation to tell good stories about others when we 
are in a position to do so (such as in delivering a eulogy or writing an obituary). One 
fictional example Eaton gives is from William Maxwell’s novel So Long, See You 
Tomorrow in which the narrator labours to ‘fulfil the obligation to give someone else a 
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story—authentic, appropriate, plausible, subtle, in short, a good story’.14 The fact that 
the narrator is concerned not only with the truth of the story but the style in which it 
is told, renders this obligation aesthetic.15 The form of the obligation it takes is an 
extension of the ethical obligation between rights and duties: we, plausibly, have an 
ethical obligation to accord due respect to others. When this respect involves telling 
a story about another person, which requires a certain style, we are—as Eaton 
argues—entering squarely into the aesthetic domain. 
Howard Press offers another reason to think that aesthetic obligations exist: they 
are derived from the principle ‘One ought to appreciate what is beautiful’.16 
Appreciation could involve a number of commitments: putting oneself in, or not 
removing oneself from, a position to appreciate what is beautiful; being duly 
sensitive to consider what is beautiful; or making an attempt to develop one’s 
aesthetic talents. When we are subject to maxims or principles the content of which 
is aesthetic, we can reasonably call it an aesthetic obligation. And perhaps then we 
can recognize that there are special obligations for the exceptionally gifted. Where 
the average person might find an aesthetic obligation to pay attention in music class 
and see if she finds playing an instrument enjoyable (and if she doesn’t then she will 
not be blameworthy if she decides take up some other hobby), another person who 
demonstrates exceptional skill in a particular area might have an obligation to take 
lessons, and so forth. Even if we do not accept that such effort is required of the 
exceptionally gifted, this sense of obligation is at least reflected in the language we 
often use in relation to such cases. If we meet someone who demonstrates great 
artistic promise, and we find out later they never pursued it, both the language we 
use and the feeling we experience often indicate we think they ought to have tried to 
develop those talents. We can see this as well in the public outcry of fans when a 
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band breaks up—it is not uncommon to hear complaints such as the band ‘owes it to 
the fans’ to put aside their differences, get back together, and make more music. 
Similar language is employed when an artist’s farewell album is comparatively 
horrible to their earlier work: it is felt that they owe it to the fans, to the music, or 
even to themselves to have ended with something better. 
These three different kinds of cases seem to be plausible examples of aesthetic 
obligation.17 Before we proceed with our argument it is worth flagging up an 
objection that we will return to later in our paper. Someone confronted with the 
examples of aesthetic obligation which we have provided may claim that the 
obligations here are not distinctively aesthetic. Instead, it might be argued that these 
are moral obligations with aesthetic content. We might think that we have moral 
obligations to promote what is valuable and that the promotion of aesthetic value is 
included in this. If this were the case, then it could legitimately be argued that all of 
the examples we have given are really cases of moral obligation, rather than aesthetic 
obligation. We will respond to this objection later in the paper however, we must 
first examine whether the obligations we have investigated in this section can be 
surpassed.  
 
III. CAN AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS BE SURPASSED? 
 
Let’s take the burning-museum case we just considered. If we can recognize that 
there is an aesthetic obligation to save the more beautiful work of art, all other things 
being equal, we are beholden to make the decision in that dilemma to save it. But 
imagine now that the more beautiful artwork is located in the next room of the 
museum—the flames are rising, and to get into that room will be considerably more 
dangerous and risky. Whilst endeavouring to save this work merits praise, not doing 
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so hardly seems blameworthy. By acting in this way I’ve certainly fulfilled the general 
aesthetic obligation to save the more beautiful painting—but I’ve also done more 
than required, in the act of putting my life in danger to do so (possibly 
demonstrating courageousness in facing that danger).  
With reference to the second case—that of telling good stories about others—we 
can identify cases of surpassing any aesthetic obligations that are in place. Eaton 
refers to how, following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a team of 
reporters at the New York Times created bespoke pieces about each person who lost 
his or her life. These ‘Portraits of Grief’, as they were called, went beyond the 
newspaper’s standard obituary format to become, essentially, short narratives akin to 
what is crafted in the genre of flash fiction. One portrait began: ‘When Oscar F. 
Nesbit went to work, he was always impeccably dressed in a suit and tie, with a 
newspaper in his hands and a greeting on his lips. He used the newspaper to satisfy 
his interest in crossword puzzles and stock tables.’ While this project was overall 
much loved and appreciated as a beautiful thing for the newspaper to have done, it 
does seem odd to suggest that the reporters were under an obligation to tell the 
stories in that way. It is precisely the poetic and impressionistic features of these 
stories that strike the reader as going beyond any existing obligations—and these 
features are aesthetic in nature.  
Eaton builds her obligation to tell good stories about others from the 
fundamental right we as individuals have to tell our own story—to be the authors of 
our own lives. This kind of autonomy may indeed function as a kind of obligation we 
have to ourselves, and can reasonably be considered aesthetic. A further plausible 
case of going beyond this obligation might be making one’s (entire) life into a 
beautiful story. Simone de Beauvoir, in her Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter, wrote about 
how as an adolescent, she 
 
dreamed of making her life into a grand story that would inspire others […]‘There was no longer 
any God to love me, but I should have the undying love of millions of hearts. By writing a work 
 	
based on my own experience I would re-create myself and justify my existence. At the same time 
I would be serving humanity. What more beautiful gift could I make it than the books I would 
write?’18 
 
Here, de Beauvoir is talking about re-creating her life in novels, telling stories that 
could inspire others. But it’s hardly surprising to see this reflected in her actual life. 
One of her biographers notes this exactly:  
 
It’s impossible to read about Beauvoir’s life without thinking about your own. You find yourself 
wanting to live more courageously, with more commitment and passion. She makes you want to 
read more books, travel across the world, fall in love again, take stronger political stands, write 
more, work harder, play more intensely and look more tenderly at the beauty of the natural 
world. That is indeed a beautiful gift.19 
 
While possessing autonomy over one’s own life and life story can be considered 
an obligation one has to herself as an individual agent, perhaps structuring one’s 
whole life as a beautiful story that can inspire others exceeds this. The contrast here 
would be between telling a story that is somewhat (or sufficiently) beautiful, and 
telling a story that is exceptionally beautiful or grand. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
paints a portrait of what might be involved here:  
 
One thing is needful. – To ‘give style’ to one’s character – a rare and great art! It is practiced by 
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an 
artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the 
eye. Here a large part of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been 
removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be 
removed is concealed; there it has been reinterpreted and made sublime. Much that is vague and 
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resisted shaping has been saved and exploited for distant views; it is meant to beckon toward the 
far and immeasurable. In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the 
constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small.20 
 
It does indeed seem plausible that organizing one’s life in this way, for the purpose 
of giving it ‘style’, is beyond the aesthetic obligation we have to tell a good story 
about ourselves.  
We have a third possible case of aesthetic supererogation—acting on the maxim 
of something like ‘appreciate what is beautiful’, ‘seek out what is beautiful’, or 
‘develop your aesthetic talents’. Consider the music lover who acts on the imperative 
to appreciate or seek out beauty by every now and then going into town to catch a 
performance by the Scottish National Jazz Orchestra: they play a style of music she 
enjoys and she’d like to learn more about by taking in the occasional live 
performance. Very broadly, we can imagine that for some individuals, attending a 
performance could be one way of acting on the appropriate maxim, thereby 
satisfying her aesthetic obligation.  
Now, imagine that she loyally follows the Scottish National Jazz Orchestra on 
their year-long world tour, attending each and every gig. Assuming our music lover is 
still getting something out of each performance, still learning and appreciating, it 
seems there is nothing blameworthy about this activity (at least not in the aesthetic 
domain), and we might be right to praise her commitment to, love for, or 
appreciation of the music. But for the average jazz enthusiast, this kind of 
commitment can hardly seem to be required, and so functions as aesthetic 
supererogation worthy of praise. 
When it comes to developing one’s aesthetic talents, it is natural to think of 
practitioners as well as patrons. Consider Van Gogh’s letters to his brother Theo, in 
which the artist writes that he paints ‘not only with color, but with self-denial and 
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self-renunciation, and with a broken heart’.21 Eric Michaud comments on these 
letters regarding the extent to which the artist went to develop his talents that ‘All 
Van Gogh’s “madness” is connected to this extreme and painful knowledge that his 
very existence as a painter requires not only separation from others, but also the 
sacrifice of others, and above all of those closest to himself.’22 Acting on the maxim 
to develop one’s aesthetic talents very likely does not ‘require’ one to separate herself 
from others, nor sacrifice others. Yet if this was what the artist went through to 
develop his talents and bring into being his work, we cannot seem to blame it 
aesthetically, and in fact a sacrifice of this kind may also be praiseworthy.  
In all three cases, then, it looks as though whatever aesthetic obligations exist 
have been surpassed. We can then say that acts of aesthetic supererogation exist. 
These acts must meet the following necessary and sufficient conditions: 
An act is aesthetically supererogatory if and only if 
  
(i*) It is aesthetically optional (neither required nor forbidden from the aesthetic 
point of view). 
(ii*) It is aesthetically better than the minimum that is required from the aesthetic 
point of view.  
 
IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE 
 
Before we conclude, it is worth discussing two objections that might be raised 
against our argument. The first objection is the one we flagged up earlier in this 
paper. It might be argued that the source of the obligation in all of the cases we have 
presented as examples of aesthetic obligation is an underlying moral obligation. 
These cases then may be seen simply as moral obligations that have aesthetic 
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content. If, for example, we think that we have a moral obligation to promote what 
is valuable, then it seems reasonable to think that the promotion of aesthetic value 
should be included within this. This allows us to account for the feeling of obligation 
to save the more aesthetically valuable painting in the burning-museum case. Rather 
than appealing to the category of the aesthetically required to make sense of this 
feeling of obligation, we can simply say that this is an example of a moral obligation. 
Similar explanations may be given for our other two cases. It seems plausible to 
think that we have moral obligations to give due respect to others. It does not seem 
unreasonable to think that fulfilling this obligation may in some situations require us 
to tell good stories about other people. Again, we can explain why this may seem 
required without making any appeal to a distinctively aesthetic form of obligation. 
Lastly, the obligation to develop one’s aesthetic talents might be thought to follow 
straightforwardly from the moral obligation to develop one’s talents in general. In all 
three cases it does not seem unreasonable to think that such moral obligations exist. 
Moreover, explaining the feeling of obligation by appealing to the existence of a 
moral obligation may be thought to provide a simpler explanation for the 
phenomena than by appealing to the existence of aesthetic obligations.  
However, two responses can be given to this worry. First, even if we accept that 
there is a moral obligation in these cases, we are not prevented from saying that there 
is also an aesthetic obligation. It may be that our sense of obligation in these cases is 
over-determined and is being generated by both a moral obligation and an aesthetic 
obligation.  
The second response is that appealing to the existence of a moral obligation with 
aesthetic content in these cases cannot account for all of the negative reactions we 
experience. Consider the following example. On 22 June 2014, the police in Deeside, 
Scotland, were contacted after a local rural beauty spot on top of Scolty Hill near 
Banchory had been vandalized. Local councillor Karen Clark had this to say about 
the incident: ‘It is a horrendous mess and people should be ashamed of themselves 
 	
for spoiling our beautiful landscape in this selfish way. Scolty Hill is valued by the 
local community. I am sure they will be upset to see this kind of antisocial behaviour 
which has such a detrimental impact on the environment.’23 This example clearly 
involves the violation of a moral prohibition. The vandalism was not only damaging 
to the local environment but can also be considered to be an assault on a shared local 
resource. Most importantly for our purposes, the vandalism harms those people who 
take pleasure in experiencing the hill’s beauty. It is tempting to think then that our 
negative reactions to this can be explained by appealing to the clear moral obligation 
that has been violated in this case.24  
However, our negative reactions to this example do not seem to be exhausted by 
our ordinary negative moral responses. Those who vandalized Scolty Hill do not only 
seem to be criticizable from the moral point of view but also from the aesthetic 
point of view. Of course we would blame those responsible and perhaps also feel 
moral outrage or resentment towards them. However, we also feel a distinct kind of 
revulsion at those who could engage in such wilful attacks on beauty. This kind of 
revulsion seems to be expressed by the chairman of the Banchory Paths Association 
when he claimed: ‘Those who cause such ugliness have very ugly minds.’25 This 
comment does not simply express moral outrage. There is a severe aesthetic criticism 
being levelled at the vandals here, which we might call aesthetic disapproval or 
aesthetic blameworthiness. A similar form of disapproval seems to be present when 
we consider the three examples of aesthetic obligation considered in Section 2. While 
we would be unlikely to experience the same force of revulsion in these cases, there 
does nevertheless appear to be a distinctly aesthetic form of disapproval that we 
would feel towards those who violate their obligation to protect or appreciate what is 
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beautiful, who show no interest in developing their aesthetic talents, and who refuse 
to tell good stories about people when the situation arises. Concerning someone who 
refuses to protect or appreciate what is beautiful, we might think that the term 
‘philistine’ could be used to express this form of aesthetic disapproval (though this 
term is also used by some as an expression of class prejudice). This form of aesthetic 
disapproval gives a reason to think that a distinctively aesthetic wrong has been 
committed. This means that even if we accept that many cases of aesthetic obligation 
will also be morally obligatory, we still have good reason to think of the aesthetically 
obligatory as a distinct normative category.  
The second objection that might be raised against our view is that these 
obligations are only surpassed from the moral standpoint. We might think for 
example, that if the obligation to tell good stories about others or ourselves is a 
moral obligation, then the act of going beyond this duty could be an act of moral 
supererogation. Of course, the obligation is also being surpassed from the aesthetic 
point of view, so this objection does not show that there are no cases of aesthetic 
supererogation. Nevertheless, if it were the case that all instances of aesthetic 
supererogation were also instances of moral supererogation, then the category of the 
aesthetically supererogatory would appear to be of less philosophical interest.  
In fact, however,, not all cases of aesthetic supererogation are also cases of moral 
supererogation. Take, for example, Van Gogh’s painful sacrifices of himself and 
those close to him for the sake of his art. These sacrifices, particularly of those close 
to him, do not seem especially praiseworthy from the moral point of view. In fact, 
we might, morally, think that they are even wrong and blameworthy.26 Nevertheless, 
Van Gogh’s sacrifices in pursuit of his artistic goals are aesthetically valuable. They 
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also surpassed his duty to develop his artistic talents. This is a case of aesthetic 
supererogation that does not seem plausible to think of as also being an instance of 
moral supererogation. The category of the aesthetically supererogatory, then, is not 




In this paper, we have argued that if aesthetic obligations exist, then we have good 
reason to think that aesthetic supererogation exists as well. We started by examining 
the conditions that are needed for the existence of acts of supererogation in a given 
normative domain. In order for there to be cases of supererogation in a given 
normative domain, that domain must generate requirements and it must be possible 
to perform acts that are better (according to the normative domain) than the acts 
required by that domain. We then argued that there is good reason to think that the 
domain of aesthetics satisfies both of these conditions.  
The first reason why this conclusion is philosophically  significant is that it adds 
to our understanding of the nature of aesthetic obligations. Like moral obligations, 
the act that is best from the aesthetic point of view need not be the act that we are 
aesthetically required to perform. By pointing out this similarity between moral and 
aesthetic obligation, our paper also contributes to the study of the similarities and 
differences between morality and aesthetics.  
Our conclusion is also significant because of the interesting new research 
possibilities that it opens up. First, our claim that acts of aesthetic supererogation are 
possible raises the question of how the problem of the ‘good-ought tie-up’ might be 
solved in the aesthetic realm. This is the problem of explaining what the connection 
between moral reasons and moral requirements might be once we have accepted that 
 	
acts of moral supererogation exist.27 On the most straightforward way of spelling out 
this connection, the act that is most strongly supported by moral reasons will be the 
act that is morally required. This view, however, is incompatible with the existence of 
acts of moral supererogation, since these will be better supported by moral reasons 
than the moral requirement that they surpass. The challenge raised by this problem is 
to find an alternative connection that is capable of make space for supererogation. A 
potentially fruitful area of research in aesthetics would be to investigate what a 
plausible solution to this problem might look like in the aesthetic realm.28  
The next set of questions raised by our conclusion concerns the agent-based 
concepts that are often thought to be closely connected to supererogation. Urmson’s 
paper on supererogation sought not only to highlight the need to make room for this 
category in moral theory but also to provide accounts of moral sainthood and moral 
heroism. These have also been influential in moral theory, leading to an investigation 
into the nature of moral sainthood in particular.29 Once we accept the existence of 
acts of aesthetic supererogation, then a natural next question is whether similar 
agent-based categories could be developed in the aesthetic realm. Can interesting 
accounts of aesthetic sainthood and aesthetic heroism be developed? If so, what 
would such people be like? Would they be the kind of people it would be rational to 
aspire to be?  
																																								 																				
27  This name is given in Heyd, Supererogation, 4. For a statement of the problem, see Alfred 
Archer, ‘The Supererogatory and How Not to Accommodate It’, Utilitas 28 (2016): 179-188. 
28  In a discussion of a different problem, Strandberg suggests that aesthetic reasons may be 
non-requiring justifying reasons. See Caj Strandberg, ‘Aesthetic Internalism and Two Normative 
Puzzles’, Studi di Estetica 44, no. 4 (2016): 23-70. This could perhaps offer a solution to the problem of 
the ‘good-ought tie-up’ in aesthetics that mirrors the solution that Horgan and Timmons offer for 
moral supererogation. See Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, ‘Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: 
Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation’, Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 29-63. 
29  See Alfred Archer, ‘Saints, Heroes and Moral Necessity’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 
77 (2015): 105-24; Archer and Michael Ridge, ‘The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of 
Supererogation’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015): 1575-1592; Vanessa Carbonnell, ‘What Moral Saints 
Look Like’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2009): 371-398; and Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’, Journal of 
Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-439. 
 	
To our minds, the most significant consequence of our conclusion is that it opens 
the door for a new line of research into the limits of aesthetic demands. Urmson’s 
paper that highlighted the existence of acts of supererogation generated an extensive 
and fruitful investigation into the limits of moral demandingness.30 We propose that 
a similar investigation has the potential to deepen our understanding of aesthetic 
reasons and aesthetic normativity. Our hope, then, is that our work in this paper 
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